Attitudes towards Death and Dying Chan, Lik Hang Nick Course title: Knowledge and Reality – an Introduction to Epistemology and Metaphysics, offered by the School of Philosophy Date: October 2005 Ø          Introduction Confucius's student asked him about serving the dead and he avoided answering by saying, "While you do not know life, how can you know about death?" Someone claims that Confucius put his student off with the reason that the spirit of the death is obscure and unprofitable to discuss (Confucius, 1966, p.142). I disagree with this claim. People in early Chinese culture generally believe that they would have good fortune if they served the spirit of the dead. It can be seen throughout the Analects that Confucius avoids talking about the spirit of the dead in order to prevent people seeking good fortune in an unhealthy way. However, the issue of death is controversial and worth discussing. It is the aim of this essay to discuss some philosophical attitudes towards death and dying. The central issues are: What kind of state is death? Socrates and Kant think that death is the separation of soul and body. The soul remains alive after the body is dead. I find this view unconvincing and will argue that both soul and body cease to exist after death. I will also attempt to explain what the implications of death for the existence of persons are and if death destroys what is good and valuable in a person's life. Feldman criticises Epicurus's argument that death is not bad, by arguing that death deprives one of life. I will argue against Feldman, using Rosenbaum's defense of Epicurus. Finally, I will discuss whether or not death can harm a person. Brueckner and Fischer claim that people generally prefer future experienced goods. Since posthumous nonexistence deprives one of future goods, the loss of existence is what people fear about death. I doubt that the prenatal and posthumous nonexistence are asymmetrical but deny Brueckner and Fisher's explanation. I accept, as Thomas Nagel says, there may be unconscious experience. But I do not put this in the deprivation argument of death. Ø          What kind of state is death? Before looking at the implication or harm of death, we must understand what death is and what state we are in after death. Most religions, like Judaism, Christianity and Islam, believe that people go to some type of heaven or hell after they die. However, human beings do not actually know where will they be after death. Since there is no obvious evidence to support this religious view, I shall assume that when humans die, they simply cease to exist. Socrates and Simmias agree that death is the separation of soul and body. Philosophers do not have much concern for food, drink, sex, clothes, shoes and other bodily ornaments. The body is considered an obstacle to the practice of philosophy. Its desires, say wealth, cause war. Given that humans cannot attain pure knowledge as embodied beings, we have to do it after death or else we can never attain it (Plato, 1997, p.56-58). Kant has a similar idea. Animal and spiritual life are both parts of the human being. The body is a necessary condition for one to live. After death, it is the animal life that ceases to exist, but not the spiritual one. Death actually liberates the body, which is a hindrance to life (1997, p.94-96). This is unconvincing. If the soul of Kant still survives, what is "he" doing? What is "he" thinking? Even if "he" exists, "he" has no communication with this world. "He" cannot defense his moral theory, nor can "he" chat with "Socrates" in a coffee shop. In contrast to Kant and Plato, Derek Parfit argues that, "after my death, there will no one living who will be me." His view about death is based on psychological attributes of personal identity, which focuses on one's memories and experiences. After one is dead, the future experience may be related to the present one indirectly. Death breaks the direct relation between these two experiences. Parfit cares less about his death because the future experience will not be related to his present one (1986, p.281-282). Basically, Parfit considers death as loss of personal identity. Parfit influences me, but I am not he. The person Parfit no longer exists. A Shakespearean play is in the style of Shakespeare but it is not the work of Shakespeare. I think Parfit's argument is sound because it describes the reality or the real world that we can observe. The claim that the soul survives is somewhat of a miracle and lacks evidence. Maybe there is heaven or hell. Maybe there is nothing after death. Nobody knows. Nobody came from heaven or hell to tell us what happens there, just as nobody came from the future to tell us what is going to happen. We know nothing about those worlds. I shall focus on this world, the world that we are living in. Thus, in this short essay, let us assume the body and the soul both cease to exist in this world after death. Ø          The implications of death for the existence of persons and if death destroys what is good and valuable in a person's life Assuming one ceases to exist after death, we move on to discuss the implications of death and weather it destroys what is good and valuable in a person's life. Epicurus claims in his "Letter to Menoeceus" that as long as a person exists, he is not dead. After his death, he does not exist. A dead person has no sensation and hence death is not bad (cited in Feldman, 1994, p.128). As Feldman notices, Epicurus's argument makes sense if pleasure and pain, good and evil consist of as sensation only (p.131). Feldman then makes a distinction between something's being intrinsically and extrinsically bad. When a person suffers from a painful experience it is intrinsically bad. On the other hand, an extrinsically bad experience is not painful but it may cause someone to suffer in another way. Clearly, death is not intrinsically bad for a hedonist. However, death may be extrinsically bad. Something is extrinsically bad only if it leads to later intrinsic bads. With this causal hypothesis, Feldman modifies Epicurus's argument with the premises: if we have no feelings while death, then death is not an intrinsic bad; and death is not bad for the one who is dead only if death is not intrinsically bad for him. Feldman rejects the new version of the argument by arguing that the causal hypothesis is false. For example, a girl has a talent for poetry. However, she is born in a country, which does not allow females to read and write. Although she is satisfied with her life, Feldman thinks this is bad because she is deprived of a chance to be a successful poet. So things may be bad even if they are not intrinsically bad. He then suggests that "something is extrinsically bad for a person if and only if he or she would have been intrinsically better off if it had not taken place." Another example is a boy dies unconsciously while undergoing minor surgery. He will be happy if he had not died. Feldman thinks the boy's death is extrinsically bad because it deprives him of what he is going to enjoy (p.133-139). In my opinion, this is where Feldman went wrong. I would hardly accept the view that death deprives someone of what he may have. Consider this argument: Franz Kafka's death in his early age is a misfortune for modern literature. I disagree with this. The argument assumes that if Kafka did not die young, he could write more good novels and short stories. However, even if Kafka could have lived longer, no one can ensure he would produce novels as great as his classics one, like America, the Castle, and the Trial. Suppose, for example, one would be very happy if he was rich. In fact he is not rich, I would not say "this is bad for him since his pleasures is deprived." Let us go back to the talented girl example. Living in a country that allows her to read and write does not guarantee that she will become a successful poet. Given that she enjoys her life, I would not consider her to have suffered on extrinsic bad. This is unlike eating poisoned candy. One will probably die after eating poisoned candy due to the fact that poisoned food causes death directly. The probability is high in this case. But the argument of deprivation is lack of certainty. The degree of certainty or probability is unknown in this case. Unlike Feldman, Rosenbaum argues that death is not bad for the person being dead because he cannot experience it. Rosenbaum starts with emphasis on the importance of distinguishing dying, death and being dead. "Dying" is the process that causes one to be dead. "Death" is used broadly and usually unclearly. "Being dead" is the state after someone dies. Making these distinctions enable Rosenbaum to reconstruct Epicurus's argument: a person P's being dead is bad for P only for the state of affairs that P can experience at a certain time. P can only experience the state of affairs which begin before P's death. P's being dead is a state of affairs that begins after P's death. So P's being dead is not a state of affairs that P can experience at that time and hence it is not bad for P. Rosenbaum thinks that people fear the nonexistence of being dead rather than the moment of death itself (1993, p.120-122). Rosenbaum's version of Epicurus's argument is sound because of his analysis of experience. What is really important to a person is his experience. The claim that "it is bad for a blind person because he can never see the painting of Leonardo da Vinci" is unsound. This claim makes an assumption that the blind person would enjoy viewing da Vinci's painting if he was not blind. The assumption is not necessarily true. Maybe he would think the Last Supper and the Mona Lisa are not aesthetically valuable. Thus, someone can experience only if he has ability to do so. He has ability only if he is alive. Conversely, one cannot experience after he dies. Death cannot deprive one of what is good and valuable because the assumption that "he will have a better life if he was not dead" lacks certainty. Furthermore, as Epicurus argued, being dead is the state of nonexistence and hence cannot be experienced by anyone. Ø          Harm of death Insofar, I have assumed nonexistence after death and being dead does not necessary deprive one of a good life. What I have argued is that death is not bad for one who is dead, assuming he is not suffering when dying. If one suffered when dying, I would admit that is a bad experience for him. Also, if one does not enjoy his life, death is harmless to him. These are less debatable. However, many people do still fear death. Thus, we must consider if death can harm a person in another way. Like Feldmam, Brueckner and Fischer agree that death can be bad because it deprives a person of goods. Brueckner and Fischer treat prenatal and posthumous nonexistence asymmetrically and hence death is bad because it deprives the good things of life. Prenatal nonexistence deprives past experienced goods, while death deprives future experienced goods. They illustrate this with an example. Someone was waiting for a drug test in a hospital. An hour of intense pleasure is induced after having the drug, but followed by amnesia. When he awoke, he was told that either he tried the drug or he is going to try it. Brueckner and Fischer claim that most people prefer the later case. That is, they did not try the drug and are going to have the pleasure. This explains that people care about their future experienced goods rather than past experienced goods (1993, p.227-228). Again, the preference for future experienced goods is not a good analogy to the deprivation argument of death. Because pleasure is guaranteed in the thought experiment, while it is not the case for death. I would consider prenatal and posthumous nonexistence asymmetrically but use a different approach. It is without doubt that an unborn person does not exist. The current Prime Minister of Australia John Howard did not exist in 1900. He will not exist in this world after his death. However, the nonexistence after his death and the nonexistence of unborn Howard are not the same. Once John Howard is born, he is a part of and contributes to this world. After Howard is dead and assuming his soul ceases to exist, his name will be in the history book and his political view will not disappear. This is an extreme case, most of us will not in the history books. But the point I would like to emphasis is that once a person exists, he makes contribution to this world. Whether or not he is influential, no one can deny his existence. This draws the different between prenatal and posthumous nonexistence. Thomas Nagel argues that a person may have unconscious experience, such as betrayal by friends, destruction of reputation and false rumors (cited in Rosenbaum, 1993, p.126). Betrayal by friends may be misfortune, but I deny that destruction of reputation and false rumors as bad experience. I would not bother if there were false rumors on me because they were not true. However, let me grant that people may have misfortune even if they do not know it. Nevertheless, this is not a proper analogy to regard death as a misfortune. Betrayed by friend is a bad unconscious experience due to the fact that it happened. In the da Vinci example I gave above, the blind person has no experience because he cannot see. I shall not conclude whether this is good or bad for him. I shall say someone is betrayed is bad because the betrayal happened and he lost his trust in his friends. Deprivation of good thing after death is an assumption without certainty. It did not happen. Hence it is harmless for the one who is dead. What death really harms are the dead person's relatives, lover and friends. Consider the terrorist attacks, earthquakes and tsunami in recent years. It is the victims' relatives who suffered most, not the dead victim and the terrorist. It is humanity that makes us feel sad and differ from other animals. Furthermore, in some sense, the mortality gives meaning to life. Ø          Conclusion In brief, I assumed that both soul and body cease to exist after death. Then, I dissent from the view that death deprives one of future good experiences since it lacks certainty. Lastly, I claim that death harms the dead person's relatives rather than the one being dead. Other issues about death such as brain death; suffering when dying; its relation to personal identity, human cloning and meaning of life; and the problem of killing and euthanasia can be discussed further.   Acknowledgment I am deeply indebted to Jennifer Bleazby. She helped me a lot in my introductory philosophy courses (Thinking about Reasoning, Knowledge and Reality) and especially this essay. Bibliography Brueckner, A.L. and Fischer, J.M. (1993) Why Is Death Bad? In Fischer, J.M. (ed.) The Metaphysics of Death. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. Confucius (1966) Confucian Analects. The Four Books: Confucian Analects, the Great Learning, the Doctrine of the Mean, and the Works of Mencius (trans. Legge, J.). New York: Pargon Book Reprint Corp. Feldman, F. (1994) Confrontations with the Reaper. New York: Oxford University Press. Kant, I. (1997) Lectures on Metaphysics (trans. Ameriks, K. and Naragon, S.). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Parfit, D. (1986) Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Plato (1997) Phaedo (trans. Grube, G.M.A.). In Cooper, J.M. (ed.) Plato Complete Works. Hackett. Rosenbaum, S.E. (1993) How to Be Dead and Not Care: A Defense of Epicurus. In Fischer, J.M. (ed.) The Metaphysics of Death. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.